相较 Drivechain，矿工更易从⚡️闪电网络偷窃

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Miners can steal from the Lightning Network, more easily than they can from Drivechain

我还痛苦地提醒您，Drivechain 比⚡️闪电网络 ** 更激励兼容 **。

相信我，我说这些并不高兴 -- ，我只是告诉你我所看到的真相。

51% 的算力可以从 LN 窃取。如果你不相信我，那就听听雷内·皮克哈特（René Pickhardt^[1]）的说法，他是《掌握闪电》的作者（也是一位天才）。参见最后一段^[2]：

据我了解，随着比特币（挖矿）网络的增长，增长了 51%攻击的可能性变得越来越小。我也很高兴被证明我所描述的攻击是错误的。

关于这次攻击的另一个可悲的事情是：我目前没有看到任何防止这种形式的 51% 攻击的（合理）方法（除了创建不提供撤销可能性的支付渠道）因为它完全滥用了闪电的核心思想来做一些事情秘密而不传播。

我们可以比较一下盗窃是多么“不方便”：

• 在闪电网络中，矿工必须要么打开每个通道，要么以某种方式与每个通道合作。
• 在 Drivechain ，矿工必须承诺在 76% 算力联盟的所有利益相关者之间分配支付，然后他们必须希望未来 3-6 个月算力所有权的相对波动不会导致不匹配。

恐怕没有可比性。Drivechain 的激励措施更好。

• 首先，纳什均衡是指矿工成为 LSP 并主导闪电网络-- ( ，假设未来闪电网络存在；正如 MARA 有自己的池一样，它也会有自己的 LSP）。LN 有很强的动机来减少中间节点 -- 的数量，如今整个网络严重依赖大约 10 个 LSP^[3]。修复 / 扩展 LN 的“官方”计划是，最好的情况是拥有类似的少量 ARK 超级节点。由于 51% 的算力可以不受惩罚地窃取这些算力，因此非矿工 LSP 与矿工 LSP 竞争是不合理的。（事实上这是自杀。）纳什均衡是只有矿工 -LSP。此时“不便”为零。

• 另一方面，由于热力学上不可避免的“挖矿运气”概念，直流电的不便基本上是无法克服的 -- 。一旦 DC 盗窃协议达成，就会出现公地悲剧 -- 每个人都有逃避的动机（并假装自己不走运）。尤其是规模较小的矿工，有动力立即退出并开采其他 sha256d 代币。特别是如果代币将在 3-6 个月内死亡 / 疲软，为什么不今天就退出呢？但由此产生的不稳定使得“交易”从一开始就几乎不可能达成。任何计划退出采矿业（超过 3-6 个月）或作为新竞争对手加入的人，或者任何可信地声称他们会这样做的人，都会搞砸这个联盟。固定支付目的地必须在第一天宣布，所有矿工必须作为一个团结的团队对其进行哈希处理 3-6 个月。（除非一个人拥有全部 76% 的算力），协调起来太困难了。

但到目前为止我还没有提到最重要的一点：Gas 费用。在 DC，所有费用都归 L1 矿工所有；在 LN 中没有一个给矿工.这些费用——每天已经有数百万美元^[4]  -- 鼓励矿工支持 DC。老实说，他们还鼓励矿工“摧毁”闪电网络。为什么他们会无缘无故地牺牲收入给闪电网络呢？（特别是因为，正如我下面所说，DC 在各方面都对最终用户来说更方便。）

所以，如果你不担心矿工从 LN 偷窃，那么你肯定也不担心他们会从 DC 偷窃。

It is also my painful duty to remind you that Drivechain is more incentive compatible than the LN.

Believe me, I take no joy in saying this -- I'm just telling you the truth as I see it.

51% hashrate can steal from LN. If you dont believe me, then take it from René Pickhardt , author of Mastering Lightning (and a genius as well). See last paragraph https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2018-March/001080.html

We can compare how "inconvenient" the theft is : in LN, miners must either open each channel, or partner with each channel somehow. In DC, miners must commit to a division of the payout among all stakeholders in the 76% hashrate coalition, & then they must hope that the relative fluctuations in hashrate ownership over the next 3-6 months do not cause a mismatch.

I'm afraid there is no comparison. The DC incentives are better.

First, the Nash Equilibrium is for miners to become LSPs and dominate the LN -- (assuming the LN exists in the future at all;  just as MARA has its own pool, it would have its own LSP). LN has very strong incentive to reduce number of intermediate nodes -- today the entire network relies critically on about 10 LSPs. https://medium.com/synonym-to/the-rise-of-lightning-service-providers-6410274d5b70 The "official" plan to fix/scale LN is, best case scenario, to have similarly a small number of ARK super nodes. Since it is the case that 51% hashrate can steal from these with impunity, it is irrational for a nonminer-LSP to compete with a miner-LSP. (In fact it is suicide.) The Nash Equilibrium is that there are only miner-LSPs. At which point the "inconvenience" is zero.

The DC inconvenience, on the other hand, is basically insurmountable -- due to the thermodynamically inevitable concept of "mining luck". As soon as the DC-theft deal is struck, there is a tragedy of the commons -- everyone has an incentive to shirk (and pretend they are unlucky). Especially the smaller miners, have an incentive to bail out immediately and mine some other sha256d coin. Especially if the coin is going to be dead/weakened in 3-6 months, why not get out today. But this resulting instability makes the "deal" almost impossible to strike in the first place. Anyone who plans to drop out of mining (over 3-6 months), or join as a new competitor, --or anyone who credibly claims that they will do either-- will screw up the coalition. The fixed payout destination must be declared on Day1, and all miners must hash on it, as a united team, for 3-6 months. (Unless one guy owns all 76% of the hashrate), it is too difficult to coordinate.

But I haven't even mentioned the most important point by far: fees. In DC, all fees go to L1 miners; in LN none of them do. These fees --already many millions of dollars per day (http://cryptofees.info)-- encourage miners to support DC. And they also --if we're being honest-- encourage miners to destroy the LN. Why would they sacrifice revenue to the LN for no reason? (Especially because, as I say below, DC is more convenient for the end user in every way.)

So, if you aren't worried about miners stealing from LN, then you definitely aren't worried they will steal from DC.

* 作者：Paul Sztorc 
* 译者：Jack3.14 
* 来源：https://x.com/Truthcoin/status/1701959339508965405?s=20

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